Fujitsu staff had ‘unrestricted and unaudited privileged access’ to Post Office branch systems and could make changes without postmasters’ knowledge, the public inquiry heard yesterday.
The Post Office Horizon IT scandal inquiry was shown an internal Fujitsu document from August 2002 which revealed ‘concern’ over staff in Fujitsu’s Software Support Centre (SSC) having access to the live system which is ‘not fully audited, and in some cases, is unrestricted in the actions that can be carried out’.
It said the workers, who provided third-line tech support to Post Office branches, have ‘unrestricted and unaudited privileged access…to all systems including Post Office counter PC’s’ and ‘there are no automatic controls in place to restrict user access’.
It warns that as a result, Fujitsu is at risk of the ‘opportunity for financial fraud, errors as a result of manual actions causing loss of service to outlets [and] infringement of the data protection act’.
Fujitsu staff had ‘unrestricted and unaudited privileged access’ to Post Office branch systems and could make changes without postmasters’ knowledge, the public inquiry heard yesterday
Asked about this by inquiry counsel Jason Beer KC, John Simpkins, a team leader within the SSC, accepted staff ‘had remote access to the live system’ but disagreed there was an opportunity to commit financial fraud or to access certain data.
Mr Beer told the inquiry some 25 staff in the SSC team had ‘privileged access’ to the live system, with Mr Simpkins revealing they had ‘admin’ permission which was ‘the highest level of access’.
Mr Simpkins, who still works for Fujitsu, also told the hearing he believed an answer given to Second Sight – the forensic accountants initially called in to investigate Horizon – regarding remote access was ‘wrong’.
Mr Simpkins was shown a document which said Second Sight wanted to know whether Post Office or Fujitsu could ‘edit transaction data without the knowledge of the sub-postmaster’
Referring to the document’s proposed answer that ‘neither the Post Office not Fujitsu can edit transaction data without the knowledge of the sub-postmaster’ Mr Beer asked Mr Simpkins if this was ‘wrong’, to which he replied, ‘I believe so’.
![Asked about this by inquiry counsel Jason Beer KC, John Simpkins, (pictured) a team leader within the SSC, accepted staff 'had remote access to the live system' but disagreed there was an opportunity to commit financial fraud or to access certain data](https://i.dailymail.co.uk/1s/2024/01/18/00/80156577-12976479-image-a-116_1705539245310.jpg)
Asked about this by inquiry counsel Jason Beer KC, John Simpkins, (pictured) a team leader within the SSC, accepted staff ‘had remote access to the live system’ but disagreed there was an opportunity to commit financial fraud or to access certain data
He was later asked about claims by Richard Roll, a Fujitsu engineer turned whistleblower, that staff would resolve frequent issues in Horizon impacting branch accounts by remotely editing transaction data without telling postmasters.
He insisted staff ‘didn’t make frequent changes…I think in 10 years, I’ve found evidence of 28 financial remote changes and I also disagree that we didn’t tell the postmasters’, claiming he has only seen one instance where this was mentioned.
Earlier in the hearing, Mr Simpkins said Fujitsu staff feared being ‘hauled over the coals’ after realising the Post Office was using ‘manipulated’ audit data to criminally investigate sub-postmasters.
He accepted his team ‘downed tools’ after learning the Post Office was using data that had ‘relevant’ material missing in its investigations.
The inquiry was told data which logged sub-postmasters’ transactions was ‘manipulated from its original source’ and given to the Post Office in a ‘filtered’ format before they used it in criminal proceedings.
![Mr Barnes said sub-postmasters should have been told of software errors as and when they happened, adding: 'The obvious thing is to send a message to the postmaster that an error has happened please contact the helpdesk'](https://i.dailymail.co.uk/1s/2024/01/18/00/80156567-12976479-image-a-117_1705539247950.jpg)
Mr Barnes said sub-postmasters should have been told of software errors as and when they happened, adding: ‘The obvious thing is to send a message to the postmaster that an error has happened please contact the helpdesk’
The hearing also heard from Fujitsu software developer Gerald Barnes, who had said an internal memo in January 2008 that issues with Horizon’s electronic point of sale service were ‘endemic’.
In his notes, he described the service as not being ‘resilient to errors’ including ‘cases where the error handling was not as good as it could have been’.
He said he felt error handling ‘could have been done much better’ but that two colleagues he mentioned this to ‘didn’t seem to think this way’.
Mr Barnes said sub-postmasters should have been told of software errors as and when they happened, adding: ‘The obvious thing is to send a message to the postmaster that an error has happened please contact the helpdesk.’
Yesterday’s inquiry appearance by Fujitsu employees comes a day after the company’s bosses were forced into grovelling apologies over the scandal, which has been thrust back under the spotlight by the recent ITV drama Mr Bates vs The Post Office. Fujitsu’s Europe boss Paul Patterson admitted his company’s central role in the ‘appalling miscarriage of justice’, in a major victory for campaigners.